Taking stock of one's Judaism
I spent the middle of August in New Hampshire, at the National Havurah Committee's 30th Summer Institute, a kind of Jewish Summer Camp for adults (and kids, too), a Jewish Brigadoon (Brigadoonowitz?) that springs into being one week a year, bringing together 300+ "serious" Jews (by Bruce's definition) of all denominations, affiliations, gender identities, etc. Lots of things are wonderful about this event and this group, and in the avoidance of lashon hara, I will not detail my frustrations -- other than to say that, for the first time in 5 years of attendance, I did not return "charged up" about my own Jewish observance in the upcoming year. I do not blame the event, not at all -- it was wonderful in a variety of ways. But again, I didn't return ready to rush (back) into shul.
The Jewish year 5768 has been a weird one for me, in several ways. I spent Rosh Hashanah in Massachusetts, with my former mother-in-law; a rabbi friend who had recently moved to the Amherst area; my son, who had started college at NYU. I spent Yom Kippur, to my deep regret, at a faculty meeting my colleagues were unwilling to reschedule and that I, an untenured person, was not in a position to miss. And that precise psychological-logistical configuration -- being an over-40, untenured person, feeling myself "too old" for half of what I was going through, and "too young" for the other half, characterized a great deal of the year.
It was a difficult year for me, but really, it was a much more difficult year for a couple of people quite close to me, and part of what I spent the year learning very incompletely was when and whether something bad happening to someone close to me, is also something bad happening to me. There are useful and unuseful, healthy and unhealthy, ways in which one can feel one's fate and well-being and happiness are bound to another, and being the parent of older adolescents (one now 16, one 18) brings that to the fore.
So what's this have to do with my Judaism? Precious little, from one point of view. The shul of which I'd been a kind of satellite member no longer holds much appeal for me. It has become so predominantly a place of "young families," full of married young adults who believe (and maybe rightly!) that Judaism will mean to their children what it means to them (even though that's nothing like what their relationship to their own parents' Judaism is) -- just not a place for me, I'm afraid. The meditation "circle" of my Hebrew teacher, who I have great affection for and hold in the highest esteem, is not quite right either -- the life-stage issues of 50- and 60-somethings are not (quite) mine. So I find myself plodding along through my Prayerbook Hebrew course (which is great) -- the siddur would really be opening up to me -- that is, if I ever prayed in a group any more.
Monday, September 1, 2008
Month of Elul, High Holidays comin' up
Thursday, August 21, 2008
Vacations
The three of us are on vacation for a week (albeit to separate places), and so is our posting. But I'm working my way through Exodus for the TMH/DH project, and I've started a post on interdenominational switching. So check in next week.
Saturday, August 16, 2008
Sefer Ha-Bloggadah
Just when you thought it couldn't get any better. The Three Jews will be one of the permanent bloggers at Sefer Ha-Bloggadah. This blog is devoted to reading and blogging about Chaim Nahman Bialik's book "Sefer HaAggadah." The book, written in Hebrew 100 years ago (and fortunately now in translation), is a collection of classical midrashim and aggadot. Our fearless blogmeister, Ben Dreyfus, has posted a schedule with short readings each day. It will take about two years to get through the whole book.
Ben also put together six "teams" of two or three people each to blog about the daily reading. At least one member of each team will blog at least one day per week, although we all may post on other days as well. The Three Jews will be blogging on Sundays. The teams come from all sorts of backgrounds, and there will definitely be widely disparate viewpoints represented.
This should be an interesting and fun way to read and review and comment on lots of classical midrashim. So pick up the book, subscribe to the blog feed, and leave some comments there as well.
Monday, August 11, 2008
God - Part 2. Refocusing the Question, not Redefining the Terms.
My last post on God was unclear on at least one issue, and others picked up on this. Larry King in a comment noted that I could be arguing either (1) that one should focus on the godliness aspect of God, or (2) that God can be redefined as the sources of Godliness. Similarly, Freethinking Upstart argued that I was simply redefining God and this language game was not very helpful.
I am not redefining God; I am simply focusing on a different question than most theists and atheists.
Theists and atheists disagree over whether God exists. This is a purely supernatural debate. I don't think either side is capable of rigorous and compelling proof, and I am agnostic on this issue. But this debate does not have much immediate practical impact. One can believe or not believe that a supernatural being exists. But the practical question that follows, at least for Jews, is how does this effect one's actions and one's involvement with Judaism?
Many atheists I know argue that if there is no God, then there is no reason to have any serious level of Jewish practice or belief. One can be culturally Jewish (throw in a yiddish phrase here and there, eat bagels, support Israel, vote Democratic : )) and do pleasant religious things (light candles on Hanukkah, or have dinner with friends on Friday night) but that's about it. My contention is that even if a Jew is a firm and convinced atheist, that Jew should still have a robust Jewish religious life. I get there not by redefining God, but by focusing on a different question.
Most decent people (including theists and atheists) agree that godliness is a real attribute and is good. Theists argue that godliness consists of acting as God Himself would act and that God exists. Atheists argue that godliness is acting as God Himself would act if He existed, but He doesn't exist. But in either case, most everyone would agree that helping someone who needs help, being kind, and honoring your parents are all acts of godliness.
My claim is that this is sufficient for a robust and meaningful Judaism. Not Orthodoxy, but perhaps a lot closer to Orthopraxy in many areas of practice than most people would initially believe. (Of course, at this point I have simply asserted this, not shown it. That will be the subject of many upcoming posts.)
My point is not that we should redefine God this way. This godliness aspect of God is PART of traditional Judaism. For example, in Exodus, Moses could not see God's face, but could only see God's back. (The rest of us cannot even do that.) Maimonides explains that Moses could not perceive God intimately, and we certainly cannot do so. We cannot know or perceive God directly, the way we know and perceive rocks and trees and friends. Instead, we must know God through acts or the natural world.
"The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament showeth His handiwork" (Psalms 19:2.) That is, we can see the glory of God through his created world.
There are numerous other examples in traditional Judaism, but the basic idea is that we experience God through natural beauty, doing mitzvot, studying, etc. Indirectly, not directly.
My contention is that we can step out of the theist / atheist debate and still have a robust and meaningful Judaism by focusing on this. Obviously, Judaism can be understood in the conventional OJ sense and these things really do reflect a supernatural God. But OJ suffers from all sorts of problems, including the documentary hypothesis. But Judaism can also be understood in the godliness sense, and that works well also. We can think of all these things as reflecting either the actual God or the ideal of God. It just does not matter.
There are lots of issues that this raises: prayer, ritual, problematic ethical rules, etc. All of these will be covered in future posts.
Wednesday, August 6, 2008
God
I think the contemporary debate over the existence of a supernatural God focuses on a less important issue. By understanding God differently (although not that differently) the supernatural issue becomes subordinated to less controversial and more important ideas about goodness and godliness.
The classical understanding of God is that He is metaphysical, is outside of time and space, is ultimately unknowable, and operates in ways we cannot understand. Not surprisingly, God then becomes a difficult thing to discuss. Atheists argue that no God exists, and theists argue that this God does exist. Each side offers arguments, some persuasive and some not, but none of which ultimately wins the day. The bottom line is that this debate is doomed never to reach an answer. Because of God's supernatural nature, it is simply impossible to determine conclusively one way or another whether or not God exists.
But I think this entire debate, fascinating as it is, completely misses the mark. Even if a supernatural God does not exist, there is no doubt that Godliness exists. And much in Judaism is about bringing this Godliness into the world. This is the approach of some liberal or moderate philosophies or Judaism, and in fact it is a major theme in some branches of traditional Judaism, like Hasidism and mysticism (divine sparks and all). This is the understanding of God that unites us, and this understanding has the potential to help even the most atheistic Jews become more observant, at least in some ways, and the most charedi Jews ground at least some of their Judaism in humanistic terms. It ties in with prayer, ritual, and most mitzvot (all of which are the subject of future posts.)
Rabbi Harold Schulweis has an interesting approach to understanding God in this way. He calls it "predicate theology." He flips sentences around. He moves God from the subject to Godliness in the predicate, and moves what was the predicate into the subject. Here's how it works.
Take a sentence like "God heals the sick." When you read this sentence, you picture a supernatural God acting in some way — perhaps knowable, perhaps not — to heal the sick. He may have provided the laws of physics and chemistry and biology, given the body the natural power to heal itself, given doctors the knowledge and skill to heal, or performed a miracle resulting in an otherwise unexplained cure. People who believe in a supernatural God quickly defend this position, people who do not attack it, and we are instantly in the middle of a supernatural theological argument.
But note what is lost in this debate: any focus on the poor sick person. The debate quickly becomes otherworldly. But Rabbi Schulweis argues that we can solve this problem, as well as many other, by simply fliping the sentence around: "Healing the sick is godly." The focus of the sentence (like most sentences) is still on the subject, but the subject has changed from God to "healing the sick". The linguistic focus is now on the sick person and his sickness. And the predicate "is godly" is something that is now uncontroversial. It is good or godly to heal the sick. Of course that is true. And godliness certainly exists, regardless of whether a supernatural God exists. (For example, "unicorn-ness" exits too, even though unicorns do not. It involves looking like a horse and having one horn. Usually there is a rainbow and a 7-year-old girl involved somehow.)
Once we make this grammatical move, we are proclaiming that healing sick people is a good thing. And the obvious follow up question is on our actions: if so, what can we do to help heal someone? We are thus acting in partnership with God (whether or not God exists) to bring Godliness into the world.
With this understanding, God is simply the source of godliness. There could be an actual supernatural God or there could not be. Healing sick people might be Godly because a supernatural God would do it, or did do it, or wants us to do it. Or it could be Godly simply because it is good, even if there is no God. It does not really matter for these purposes. The important point is to focus on the very real and very this-worldly Godliness, not aspects of uncertain supernatural God.
Ironically, this belief is not all that radical and is found solidly within traditional Judaism. Perhaps the most commonly-said blessing by all Jews is the blessing over bread: hamotzi lechem min haaretz. We praise God for bringing bread from the earth. But of course God does not actually bring bread from the earth. At most, God (or the blind forces of nature) brings grain from the earth. People, not God, then turn the grain into bread. And there is a huge difference from our perspective between bread and hot, wet, yeasty, ground-up wheat, even though they are not all that difference chemically. The difference is goodness. Or godliness. Thus, people act in partnership with God or Godliness when they make bread. They bring Godliness into the world by taking raw ingredients and making them better.
The traditional blessing is to praise God for the complete process of "bringing forth bread from the earth." If understood the traditional way — a supernatural God made bread by a miracle — the blessing is absurd. God does not actually make the bread, just the wheat. But if the blessing is understood in terms of godliness, it simply means that bringing forth bread is godly or good. And that is a proposition that everyone can agree to. (Unless you are on a low-carb diet, and then it become more controversial.)
Rabbi Schulweis seems to suggest that under his understanding, a supernatural probably God does not exist. My co-blogger Diane has referred to God as a "non-ontological being", with the same suggestion. That is, God is like goodness or justice or kindness: an important and meaningful idea or ideal, but one without any correspondence to an actually existing object or thing.
I do not go this far. I do not see anything in this understanding of God that either precludes or requires that God be or not be a supernatural being. At the deepest level, I simply think it is impossible to know anything about the existence and nature of a supernatural God. One can believe in a supernatural God as a matter of faith or reason. Or one can refuse to believe in such a God as a matter of lack of evidence, lack of faith, or reason. Both positions are supportable, neither is compelling, and neither is all that interesting to me. I want to focus on bringing Godliness into the world, not on debating abstract and unresolvable questions.
A traditional theist would agree with everything I have said so far, but argue that this focus on godliness only captures part of the nature of God. That is, a traditional theist would not disagree with this claim but argue only that it is woefully incomplete.
An atheist would agree with everything I have said but argue that it is silly to use the words "God" or "godliness" to refer to purely naturalistic things when they are loaded with supernatural connotations.
Both points are partially valid. I concede the traditional theists' point, but relegate the other supernatural aspects of God to faith. And I agree with the atheist that God has some supernatural connotations, but also has some naturalist ones.
But here is why this approach is important and where this approach really pays off. Many people do not believe in a supernatural God, or are not sure whether they believe in God, and view this belief (or lack of belief) as an obstacle precluding their participation in Judaism, at least in a meaningful and significant way. Several readers of this blog fall into this category. I strenuously disagree, and I think this conclusion does not follow from the premise. Even if one does not believe in a supernatural God, one still can (and probably does) believe in godliness and goodness. And that is sufficient.
My (admittedly controversial) contention is that Jewish practices, beliefs, prayer, holidays, and rituals, are spectacular and spectacularly subtle ways of fostering Godliness and goodness. Thus, I think that even the most ardent Jewish atheist (in the classical sense) should become more observant, do more rituals, and even pray. I will be spelling out the details of some of these contentions in later posts. But for this post, I am simply contending that everyone should believe in God as the source — supernatural or natural, ontological or non-ontological — of goodness and Godliness.
Monday, August 4, 2008
Rubashkin's, Ethical Kashrut, etc.
How should we think about the appropriate Jewish response to the allegations about Rubashkin's?
In addressing this question, I write as a lawyer, a (mostly) vegetarian, a Jew, and a person who cares about human rights and the rights of workers. I'd like to think those perspectives don't contradict each other, but they certainly are not the same.
As best I can glean from news reports, the "scheme" taking place at Rubashkin's involved falsified employment papers for mostly Guatemalan workers. Because the falsification involved using identity documents or numbers of actual people, the government is treating the offense as "aggravated identity theft" -- even though there appears to be good reason to believe the workers in question had no real idea of what was going on. The prosecution of these workers is itself problematic in all sorts of ways -- so much so, that the translator hired by the government, in a possible breach of his own professional ethics, has acted as a "whistle-blower" to talk about what has gone on. The long and short of it, for our purposes here, appears to be that these workers were inveigled into an illegal employment scheme by Rubashkin's, got "caught" and are going to be punished for it (by deportation, at least).
For me, if there is reason to believe (and there is) that anyone in management was behind this scheme -- knew about it, planned it, and of course, benefited from it -- I don't want to do business with these folks. Period.
Now, as a (mostly) vegetarian, perhaps such talk is cheap. I hardly eat meat from one end of the month to the other, and went more than a decade without eating it at all. So let me try to imagine that they were, for example, my favorite ice-cream manufacturer....
Again, I think the solution is just as easy. BUY ANOTHER ICE CREAM. The idea that indulging my mere preference, when there is reason to believe it is coming at the cost of significant wrong-doing, is somehow OK, seems to me indefensible. Rubashkin's is not the only game in town, for goodness' sake. (The biggest, the cheapest, the easiest, maybe. But not the only.)
But none of what I've said so far has much to do with Judaism or kashrut. So let's turn to those topics. It is possible -- I'm no mashgiach -- that absolutely nothing Rubashkin's is accused of, would implicate the kashrut of its products. I'm willing to grant that may be true. If so, that demonstrates, at best, the incompleteness of kashrut for exhausting the moral dimension of eating. For those chafing under the yoke of kashrut, it might seem that being asked to impose still additional requirements (but is it organic? but is it fair trade? but are their workers unionized?) is just too much to ask. For those serious about halakhah, they would then appear to be choosing certain laws about food, over other, equally serious, laws about treatment of workers and more general morality. I think that's a bad choice -- and I could say a good deal about why -- but that is the choice. But for those to whom the purpose of kashrut is supposed to have something to do with "You shall be holy," it's just ridiculous to suggest that the demands of that do not encompass everything that bears on how a particular food ends up on one's table. "Halakhic man" (or woman), who will inquire into the holiness dimension of every activity in which it is possible for a person to engage, cannot be indifferent to whether the chain of events that bring a food product from earth to table includes unfair labor practices or the abuse of the earth. Putting blinders on by asking "but is it kosher?" and nothing more, is just ridiculous.
Which brings me to the last point -- one I tend not to make in very many contexts. And that is shanda. This entire episode is a classic "shanda for the goyim" (pardon my broken Yiddish) -- that is, a scandal that makes Jews look bad before the non-Jewish world. I don't think Rubashkin's is the worst meat-packing plant in the world. Probably not the worst in the U.S. But I don't care. They are Jews, and they are holding all of us up to ridicule and derision. They are making Jews appear to be people who care about ridiculous, archaic, hyper-technical rules (is the animal standing up or lying down?), while tolerating the most egregious, abusive, illegal labor practices. They make me ashamed to be a Jew. They make a travesty of our deep moral traditions, which have put Jews on the front lines of every battle for fair labor practices, for ecologically-sensitive agriculture, and so on. And they do so under the mantle of "Orthodoxy." They play into the hands of every anti-Semite and Jew-hater anywhere. And for that -- unless they are completely exonerated in a way that seems quite impossible at this point -- they should be roundly condemned and put out of business by the Jewish community acting as one.
Tuesday, July 29, 2008
God, Objective vs. Subjective Ethics (and Meta-Ethics), and the Limits of Moral (and Legal) Authority
Many religious people, including many religious Jews, believe that without God, there can be no "objective" ethics and, the argument continues for some, therefore no legitimate basis on which to define ethical conduct or "impose" moral authority on others.
I do not subscribe to this view.
In my experience, there is some confusion over what people mean by "objective" ethics. So, let me begin by offering two very different definitions, one focused on first-order ethics -- that is, defining what is "right" and "wrong" -- and the other focused on meta-ethics -- that is, defining the nature and foundation of ethics:
First-order "objective ethics" refers to ethical precepts of a general nature that apply similarly in all relevantly similar situations and circumstances. (Conversely, "subjective ethics" in this sense means that each individual defines his or her own ethical precepts, which may be different from other people in relevantly similar circumstances, and perhaps even different for the same person in relevantly similar circumstances.)
Meta-ethical "objective ethics" refers to ethical precepts that are external to human beings, like the law of gravity. (Conversely, "subjective ethics" in this sense means that moral views are human opinions grounded in human realities such as biology, psychology, and social interaction.)
Based on these definitions, several observations can be made:
1. Whether one subscribes to the objective or subjective meta-ethical view, one can adopt the first-order objective view. That is, whether we believe ethics are an independent constant or a human construction, we can believe that first-order ethical precepts apply similarly in similar situations.
Now, this is not to say that the subjectivist believes that ethical precepts can be "true" or "false" -- that is, demonstrated as one would a mathematical proof or the law of gravity. But to say they cannot be proven is not to say they are not objective. It is one thing to claim that some action in some set of circumstances -- say, torturing your child for getting up from the dinner table, or ignoring the presence of a destitute beggar on the street -- is always "right" or "wrong." It is a very different thing to claim that this can be demonstrated to anyone using some set of logical principles (and that any lack of agreement could only be explained by some failure of apprehension).
(Incidentally, although there is a difference of opinion about whether first-order precepts can be "true" or "false," both meta-ethical objectivists and subjectivists agree that meta-ethical statements can be true or false.)
2. The meta-ethical subjective stance is not the same as moral relativism. One can take the view that moral principles are a human construct, but nonetheless do not necessarily vary in different contexts and cultures.
3. The meta-ethical subjective stance is not the same as moral nihilism. One can take the view that moral principles are a human construct, but nonetheless have substance and meaning.
4. Theists need not be meta-ethical objectivists, and atheists need not be meta-ethical subjectivists. Although atheists often adopt the subjectivist position, it is logically possible and not uncommon for atheists to advance the argument that ethics can be objectively derived from the nature of humans and reality. Similarly, although theists usually adopt the objectivist position, it is logically possible and not uncommon for theists to believe that God did not "create" moral law. (The Euthyphro dilemma speaks to this latter issue.)
I adopt the subjectivist meta-ethical view because I believe first-order ethical precepts are inextricably linked with "values" -- propositions about what is meaningful and worthwhile that are connected to, but not logically dictated by, "facts" about humans and the world.
If we believe there is no God, or that God did not "create" a moral reality, we are not launched into a moral abyss without any points of reference for humans to create ethical constructs. Virtually all humans share the same basic survival and growth needs, certain core emotional responses, and certain core social behaviors. We all share the same physical reality and rules of logic.
Thus, we can have meaningful conversations about values being more or less desirable notwithstanding the fact that we may not be able to "prove" anything in this regard. The reasons why most people agree about murder might be more like the reasons most people agree about sauerkraut ice cream than we think.
Western philosophy has offered a variety of systems for weighing values and making moral judgments, based on virtue, justice, natural rights, utilitarianism, and the common good, among other things. None of these is completely satisfactory to me, but they all offer signposts. They also present more than a little evidence for the proposition that meaningful conversations are possible in the absence of a provable solution.
But if murder really is a lot like sauerkraut ice cream, some have argued, we lose any basis on which to "impose" our moral judgment on others -- whether through mere moral persuasion or an attempt to actually control and/or punish certain behavior.
The former proposition is simpler to address. We can try to "convince" people that fine French food is "better" than sauerkraut ice cream (or McDonald's or fine Italian food) by appealing to their own internal sense perceptions and instincts, principles of cooking, facts about the nature of the human tongue and taste sensation, and on and on. And we can try to "convince" people that murder is "worse" than the alternative by appealing to their own internal perceptions and instincts, principles of human biology and psychology, social dynamics, the value systems listed above, and on and on.
But we cannot "prove" murder is wrong any more than we can "prove" sauerkraut ice cream is yucky. This is in my view a reality of the human condition.
And even if we could "prove" ethical rules, that would not result in everyone following them. This is in my view another reality of the human condition.
The good news from my point of view is that Judaism is a superb vehicle for tackling moral issues. This is not because God exists, or because the Torah was written by God, but because the Torah and other sources of Jewish wisdom do an excellent job of elucidating a set of values that are well-grounded in the realities of human nature and experience and exploring not only how they fit together, but also how they stand in tension. (After all, "ethical dilemmas" usually arise when important values stand in opposition, not when everything points in the same direction.) For someone preoccupied with ethical behavior -- "making better people and making people better," as I am fond of saying -- Judaism is first and foremost useful.
The latter proposition -- the use of individual force or communal police power -- is not so much a matter of ethics as political philosophy. Our right to stop (or punish) the murderer is not based on the fact that we can "prove" that murder is wrong; it is based on our individual desire to protect ourselves and others from being murdered and from our communal agreement to form societies and governments that will exercise this power on our behalf.
The reason that murder and sauerkraut ice cream are different is not that one is a matter of fact and the other is a matter of taste. The difference lies in the fact that murderers create consequences that sauerkraut ice cream eaters do not. The decision to stop or punish the murderer lies in a moral and political consensus about the desirability of doing so and not on pure logic.
In this realm, Jewish wisdom is somewhat less useful. The Torah and Oral Law more or less assume a world in which Jewish religious authority and government authority are one in the same. There are not simply moral maxims and lessons; there are consequences and penalties imposed not only by God but also by men. This is not to say that Jewish wisdom does not speak to issues of politics and government. But in our modern secular world, there is generally a disconnect between religious authority on the one hand and government authority and police power on the other. (Indeed, some religious conservatives have as a top priority either eliminating this disconnect or working around it through separation from secular society.) A moral consensus, based on religious principles or otherwise, may produce the political consensus necessary to exercise authority, but that does not mean that the moral and political consensus are one in the same.
Sunday, July 27, 2008
The Documentary Hypothesis In Detail - Genesis
I have compiled the following table showing all the verses in Genesis and which source they are from. I have used two separate classifications: Richard E. Friedman's from The Bible With Sources Revealed (2003) and Samuel Driver's from Introduction to the Literature of the Old Testament (9th ed 1913) (Google Books version of Driver here.) I have also marked the verses with an asterisk where they differ, and finally included some explanatory notes by Friedman and Driver. These two versions are remarkably similar, especially given that they are separated by a very busy century.
These two versions differ in at least two notable respects.
1. Driver explained that it was fairly easy to tell the difference between P on the one hand and J, E, and JE on the other. However, distinguishing between J and E is much harder in places. Many of the differences between Friedman and Driver involve J and E classifications.
2. Friedman assigns several transitional versed to R (the redactor), but Driver assigns them to P, who was in fact doing some redacting. I think this difference stems largely from the difference in the dating of P. Driver and most early bible scholars assigned P to after the Babylonian exile, while Friedman and many (but not all) contemporary bible scholars assign P to before the exile. Thus, Friedman believes there was a much greater separation between P and R, whereas Driver believes they might have been the same person or at least contemporaries.
At this point, I am not making any sort of argument. I am simply laying out the theory to be tested. My plan is to make a similar chart for Exodus through Deuteronomy. After that, I will compile a list of the characteristics that the DH advocates claim can be found in each of the sources. Once I have completed that, I will have identified the theory to be tested. And then I'll test it.
Here's information about the table.
F - Friedman
D - Driver
Diff - Different. * if Friedman and Driver are difference, nothing if they are the same.
Sources:
J - J
E - E
RJE - Redactor of J and E
P - P
R - Redactor
O - Other
Here's the table.Chapter F D Diff Notes Genesis 1:1 - 2:3 P P 2:4a R P * 2:4b - 2:25 J J F: R inserted "Elohim" after YHWH 3:1 - 24 J J F: R inserted "Elohim" after YHWH 4:1 - 24 J J 4:25-26a R J * 4:26b J J 5:1 -28 O P * F: Book of Records 5:29 R J * 5:30-32 O P * F: Book of Records 6:1-8 J J 6:9a R P * 6:9b-22 P P 7:1-5 J J 7:6 J P * 7:7 J J 7:8-10 P J * 7:11 P P 7:12 P J * 7:13-16a P P 7:16b J J 7:17a J P * D: except for "40 days" 7:17b J J 7:18-20 J P * 7:21 P P 7:22-23 J J 7:24 P P 8:1-2a P P F: to "skies were shut" 8:2b-3a J J 8:3b-5 P P 8:6 J J 8:7 P J * 8:8-12 J J 8:13a P P 8:13b J J 8:14-19 P P 8:20-22 J J 9:1-17 P P 9:18-27 J J 9:28-29 O P * F: Book of Records 10:1a R P * 10:1b-7 P P 10:8-19 J J 10:20 P P 10:21 J J 10:22-23 P P 10:24-30 J J 10:31-32 P P 11:1-9 J J 11:10a R P * 11:10b-26 O P * F: Book of Records 11:27a R P * 11:27b P P 11:28-30 P J * 11:31a P P F: to "land of Canaan" 11:31b R P * 11:32a O P * F: Book of Records 11:32b R P * 12:1-4a J J 12:4b-5 P P F: "from Haran" added by R 12:6-20 J J 13:1-5 J J 13:6 P P 13:7-11a J J 13:11b-12a P P 13:12b-18 J J 14:1-24 O O 15:1-12 J E * F: "Ur of the Chaldees" in 7 added by R; D: parts from J 15:13-17a R E * F: to "and the sun was setting" 15:17b-21 J E * 16:1a J P * 16:1b-2 J J 16:3 P P 16:4-14 J J 16:15-16 P P 17:1-27 P P 18:1-33 J J 19:1-28 J J 19:29 P P 19:30-38 J J 20:1a RJE E * 20:1b-18 E E 21:1a J J 21:1b P P 21:2a J J 21:2b-5 P P 21:6 E E 21:7 J E * 21:8-32 E E 21:33 E J * 21:34 E E 22:1-10 E E 22:11-14 RJE E * 22:15 RJE J * 22:16-18 E J * 22:19 E E F: "word of YHWH" in 16 added by RJE 22:20-24 J J 23:1-20 P P 24:1-66 J J 25:1-4 E J * 25:5-6 RJE J * 25:7-11a P P 25:11b J J 25:12 R P * 25:13-17 P P 25:18 P J * 25:19 R P * 25:20 P P 25:21-26a J J 25:26b J P * 25:27-33 J J 26:1-33 J J 26:34-35 P P 27:1-45 J J 27:46 P P 28:1-9 P P 28:10 J J 28:11a J E * 28:11b-12 E E 28:13-16 J J 28:17-18 E E 28:19 J J 28:20-22 E E 29:1 J E * 29:2-14 J J 29:15-23 J E * 29:24 J P * 29:25-28 J E * 29:29 J P * 29:30 J E * 29:31-35 J J 30:1a J E * 30:1b-3a E E 30:3b E J * 30:4a J J 30:4b-5 E J * 30:6 E E 30:7 E J * 30:8 E E 30:9-16 E J * 30:17-20a E E 30:20b E J * 30:20c-22b(a) E E 30:22b(b) E J * 30:23 E E 30:24a E J * 30:24b-41 J J 31:1 E J * 31:2 E E 31:3 J J 31:4-16 E E 31:17 J E * 31:18a P E * 31:18b P P D: from "and all" 31:19-45 E E 31:46 E J * 31:47 E E 31:48-50 E J * 31:51-54 E E 31:1-2 E E 32:3 E J * 32:4-13a J J 32:13b J E * 32:14-21 E E F: "And he spent the night there" in 14 added by RJE 32:22 E J * 32:23 E E 32:24-32 E J * 32:33 E ? * 33:1-18a E J * 33:18a R P * F & D: "which was in the land of Caanan, when he was coming from Paddan Aram" 33:18b-20 E E 34:1-2a J P * 34:2b-3 J J 34:4 J P * 34:5 J J 34:6 J P * 34:7 J J 34:8-10 J P * 34:11-12 J J 34:13-18 J P * 34:19 J J 34:20-24 J P * 34:25 J Part J, part P * 34:26 J J 34:27-29 J P * 34:30-31 J J 35:1-8 E E 35:9-13 P P F; "again when he was coming from Paddan Aram" in 9 added by R 35:14 P J * 35:15 P P 35:16-20 E E F: And they travelled from Beth El" in 16 added by R 35:21-22a J J 35:22b-29 P P 36:1 R P * 36:2-30 P P F: Esau's geneology uncertain. D: 2-5, 9-28 probably from independent source 36:31-43 J P * 37:1 P P 37:2a J P * 37:2b J E * F: "These are the records of Jabob" added by R 37:3a E E 37:3b J E * 37:4 E E 37:5-11 J E * 37:12-18 E J * 37:19-20 J E * 37:21 E J * 37:22 E E 37:23 J E * 37:24 E E 37:25a E J * 37:25b-27 J J 37:28a E E F & D: to "pit" 37:28b J J D: to "silver" 37:28c J E * 37:29-30 E E 37:31-35 J J 37:36 E E 38:1-30 J J 39:1-23 J J 40:1a E E 40:1b E J * 40:2-3a E E 40:3b E J * 40:4-15a E E 40:15b E J * 40:16-23 E E 41:1-14a E E 41:14a E J * D: "and they brought him quickly from the dungeon" 41:15-45 E E 41:46a P P 41:46b R P * 42:1-4 J E * 42:5 E E 42:6 J E * 42:7 E E 42:8-20 J E * 42:21-25 E E 42:26 J E * 42:27-28 J J 42:29-34 J E * 42:35-37 E E 42:38 J J 43:1-13 J J 43:14 E E 43:15-23a J J 43:23b E E 43:24-34 J J 44:1-34 J J 45:1-2 J E * 45:3 E E 45:4a-b J E * 45:4c J J D: "and they brought him quickly from the dungeon" 45:5 J E * 45:5 J J D: "that ye sold me thither" 45:6-10 J E * 45:10 J J D: "to Goshen" 45:11-28 J E * 46:1 E J * D: "Israel" 46:1-5a E E 46:5b J E * 46:6-27 P P 46:28-34 J J 47:1-4 J J 47:5-6a P P 47:6b P J * D: LXX has 6b (re making livestock officers) after 4. 47:5-12 P P 47:13-26 E J * F: difficult to determine whether J or E 47:27a J J D: to "Goshen" 47:27b-28 P P D: from "and they" 47:29-31 J J 48:1-2 E E 48:3-7 P P 48:8-22 E E 49:1a J P * 49:1b-27 J J F: based on an older composition 49:28a R J * 49:28b R P * 49:29-33 P P 50:1-11 J J 50:12-13 P P 50:14 J J 50:15-21 E E 50:22 J E * 50:23-26 E E
Tuesday, July 22, 2008
Tradeoffs in Judaism Between Truth and Goodness. Or Not.
XGH has another interesting post called Massively Conflicted. His problem, simply put, is he thinks there is a lot of good in Orthodoxy but a lot of stupidity as well. And he keep cycling through different resolutions of this problem, with little success.
I think he is looking at the problem wrong. As XGH frames the issue, there are trade-offs between truth and goodness and XGH simply needs to optimize. But (as we argue in various ways in this blog), once Judaism is understood from a more moderate or liberal perspective, there might not really be any trade-offs and in fact the optimum is a more moderate form of Judaism. Let me analyze the problem first, and then try to argue for a solution.
The Orthodox world has a lot of goodness: solid communities, commitment to good things, meaningfulness, etc. It also has some badness (agunah problem, crazy obsession with trivial things, etc.). And it advocates things that many people like XGH believe are false, like the Mosaic / Divine authorship of the Torah. It tries to be a complete worldview (or a totalizing discourse, as the post-moderns call it).
As one shifts into more moderate or liberal forms of Judaism, the particularly Jewish aspects of goodness are fewer and less pronounced. There are fewer people committed to Jewish practices and community, and there is less learning and knowledge. Judaism is only somewhat important to moderate and liberal Jews, or as Arnold Eisen has argued, the commitment of more liberal Jews to Judaism partial. But with less emphasis on Judaism comes a greater emphasis on secularism, for all its good (science, good secular entertainment, pluralism, democracy) and bad (bad secular entertainment, nihilism). But it is easier to square moderate and liberal forms of Judaism with truth, at least from XGH's perspective: the idea that the Torah is literally from God and written by Moses is rare in moderate and liberal circles. It certainly will not get you kicked out.
As you shift to complete secularism, you find all of the good and bad of secularism and little or no of Judaism's good (real communities) and bad (agunah problems).
That's the problem. For some people, there is a corner solution, as economists put it. Traditional Orthodox Jews think that Orthodoxy is a lot better than other forms of Judaism and secularism and think that God really did give the Torah to Moses. Their choice is easy. Secular Jews think that traditional religious practices are outmoded and silly and God did not give the Torah to Moses. Their choice is easy as well. Moderate to liberal Jews (like me) think that a more moderate form of Judaism encompasses both the best of tradition and modernity, as well as being based on true premises. Our choice is easy too.
But what about someone like XGH, who thinks that traditional practices are mostly good with some bad mixed in, but that Orthodoxy believes false things?
Three options.
First, one can argue that truth always trumps goodness, and move away from Orthodoxy.
Second, one can argue that goodness always trumps truth, and move towards Orthodoxy.
Third, one can conclude that there is some tradeoff between the two and then optimize.
There's really no getting around this tradeoff if one values both truth and goodness. One should simply think about it, make a decision, recognize its imperfections, and live with it. That's life.
But let me go back a minute and argue for my position: this tradeoff might not be a real one.
As I have argued in The Theory of the Other Theory, a moderate or liberal Jew must ask what the biblical interpreters and Talmudic rabbis were actually doing, regardless of what they thought they were doing. I think they were wrestling with the great questions in life and came up with lots of really great ideas. They expressed these ideas through through particularly religious modes, but it is the ideas themselves that are great, not the religious expression. This provided the basis for a cohesive Jewish community that has lasted for 2,000 years. As the ideological heirs to this tradition, we can try to understand it in more current ways. And if one accepts the DH, for example, one can try to understand the divinity of the Torah in a different way than chazal literally did, but still understand it as divine in the broader or structural or functional way that chazal did.
This approach is pretty mainstream in Conservative and Reform Judaism, is the sine qua non of Reconstructionism, but is completely marginalized in Orthodoxy. (Think Louis Jacobs, if not the reaction to James Kugel.)
From an Orthodox perspective, this approach is some sort of half-way measure for people who are just not committed enough to practice "Torah true" Judaism. Although this belief is not universally held, it is frequently held in the Orthodox world, and I view this belief as one of the great failings of Orthodoxy. I see this viewpoint subconsciously expressed in several of the regular commentators here who grew up Orthodox, rejected Orthodoxy, but still equate Orthodoxy with "true" Judaism and thus reject all of Judaism. This belief has energized a huge percentage of Israeli Orthodox Jews, and it has caused most of Israeli Jews to reject most of Judaism completely. It is sad to me that a more moderate approach to Judaism is both ideologically sound and the answer to many problems.
One might object to this argument on the ground that more liberal Judaism does not have "real" communities like Orthodoxy does. That's mostly true. But Orthodox communities are based on a shared set of beliefs and practices, and those practices include things like TMH. Thus, one might be a member of an Orthodox community, but some percentage of that community might believe that dinosaurs did not exist, that evolution did not occur, that the flood is literally true, and that the universe is 6,000 years old. There are downsides to a community based on false or problematic beliefs. But it is certainly true that moderate and liberal Jewish comminities, with fewer common beliefs and practices, are less coherent.
There is no perfect solution. As I previously wrote, I agree with XGH's overall strategy for moving Judaism forward. And one thing that XGH (and me, and you) can do is to work to make these places better. The issue is whether one starts in a more moderate or liberal place and tries to make it more serious, scholarly, and communal, or whether one starts in a more Orthodox place and tries to make it more rational and reasonable. There is no easy answer to that question.
Friday, July 18, 2008
The Future of American Judaism?
There's an interesting post over at "Angstgnostik Reconstructodox Modern Orthoprax" (or XGH or whatever he is calling his blog today) called Our Strategy. XGH is an orthoprax Jew who likes Orthodox practices but accepts the DH and many other modern beliefs that, in one way or another, undermine traditional Orthodox beliefs. For the past few years, he has been taking widely disparate ideas and crashing them together in am intellectual Judaism-modernity supercollider, in the hopes of generating new super-particles ideas that might reconcile this conflict.
His most recent post sets out a broad program for what he is doing. In short, it is an attempt to bring in a more critical, open, and modern understanding of Judaism while at the same time keeping a more traditional orthoprax lifestyle. This is left-wing Modern Orthodoxy, with a bit of Reconstructionism thrown in.
I think he has identified the broad outlines of the future of American Judaism, and it is similar to the one that I (and Steve and Diane, I think) advocate, at least in very general terms. Here's why.
Some current RW Orthodox thinking requires shutting out some contemporary ideas, even if they are true or useful or powerful. Instead of dealing with these head-on, these thinkers and communities simply ignore them. This sort of head-in-the-sand approach might build communities, but the communities face the ever-present risk of being undermined as soon as people are exposed to contrary ideas. That works for a while, but it is no way to hold a community together in the long run.
At the other extreme, it is not clear to me that secular / cultural / non-halachic / non-traditional approaches to Judaism can survive as Judaism. These movements may end up doing much good, but by untethering themselves from the essential characteristics of Judaism, they risk drifting too far from anything that we might meaningfully think of as Judaism.
That leaves the broad middle. A type of Judaism dedicated that embraces the important and good aspects of modernity but remains "a people that dwells apart, not reckoned among the nations" as last week's parsha put it. Taking halacha and tradition seriously, but retaining the flexibility to chance halacha when there is a compelling need. In short, a dedication to both tradition and change. Sound familiar?
It should. This is the same approach as the one advocated by Conservative Judaism in the first half of the 20th Century. That movement worked well in many respects and did not work well in other respects. Part of the problem with Conservative Judaism today, as people have noted, is that many lay people have very little understanding of, and thus little interest and involvement in, the greatness of traditional Judiasm. Reversing this is one of the challenges facing Conservative synagogues.
There is an open question as to whether this approach to Judaism will emerge as a more modern shift in Orthodox thinking or as a more traditional shift in Conservative practice. It may even come from the Reform movement if it could re-embrace halacha and tradition, and subordinate its radical individualism, in a serious way. But whereever it comes from, I think it is the future of American Judaism.
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