Showing posts with label Bible Criticism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Bible Criticism. Show all posts

Monday, June 23, 2008

The Documentary Hypothesis, Torah Min Hashamayim, and Bayes' Theorem - The Implications

Now for the qualitative implications of Bayes' Theorem to TMS / DH debate. Bayes' Theorem starts with an initial probability (or a probability estimate) prior to any information. It then shifts this initial probability as new information comes out that is either more consistent or less consistent with each of the two theories. There are at least five implications for the TMH/ DH debate.

First of all, Bayes' Theorem requires an initial probability estimate. In the example above, we could make the assumption that 50% of the jars were Type Y jars. But there's no good way to make any estimate in the TMH / DH debate. Some people might start with the initial premise that it is highly likely that there is a God and that He would want to give a set of instructions to people. They would start with the premise that the probability that TMS is true is very high. Others would think it is highly likely that there is no God and, if there were, He already gave sufficient guidance through natural law and reason, and so there is no need for Him to do so by some divine revelation. These people would the premise that the probability that TMS is true is very small.

One implication of this is consistent with what we see on both sides of this debate. As proponents of one theory present what they think is a pretty compelling argument, the other side responds with a bored yawn. "That may be fascinating, but I just don't see that that gets you very far." But the proponents disagree and think the argument is brilliant and airtight and proves their theory is correct. Neither side understands how the other can either miss the power of their airtight argument or make such a silly argument. The explanation for this breakdown in communications may lie in Bayes' theorem.

The argument might in fact be quite good. But the opponents are starting with a very low estimate of the prior odds. Consequently, this very good argument does not shift the odds that much. Or alternatively, the argument might not be that good. The proponents think it is great because their estimate of their theory being correct is very hight. But their odds started off high in the first place. In either case, Bayes' theorem explains the frequently observed result of debates in this area: a frustrating sense that the other guy just does not get it.

The second implication of Bayes theorem is that it points us to what sort of arguments should be convincing. A convincing argument is one where the following condition holds: the probability of the new fact being true given that one theory is true is greater than the probability of the fact being true given that the other theory is true. The focus has to be on relative probabilities here, not absolute probabilities.

Here's a real example of this problem. I once mentioned to an Orthodox friend that many other ancient cultures had flood stories similar to the Biblical flood, and the Gilgamesh story is remarkably similar to Noah's flood story. To me, this seemed like a good argument supporting the claim that the Biblical flood story was derived from these other stories. My friend argued that this cuts the other way: this independent corroboration supports the historicity of the flood story.

It took me a while to unpack this exchange, but Bayes' theorem provided the key. My argument, more fully expressed, was that if you assume the DH is true, then it is not surprising (that is, there is a high probability) that there are actual ancient sources for the various Biblical stories and that there is some chance that we can actually find some of these. And we did. That argument is right, as far as it goes. My friend's point was that if you assume TMH is true, then it is not surprising (that is, there is a high probability) that there is independent corroboration of these historical stories. And that is right also, as far as it goes. But both of us were looking at only half of the problem.

The way to advance this argument is to look to relative probabilities, not absolute probabilities. That is, we each need to find facts that are more consistent with our theory and less consistent with the other theory. For example, as many have argued — including most recently James Kugel in How to Read the Bible — some of the literary aspects of the Gilgamesh story are virtually identical to the Noah story. This is pretty likely if one was copied from the other, but it is pretty unlikely if these are two independent literary witnesses to the same historical event thousands of years earlier. I don't mean to start a debate on the flood here (plenty of time for that later), but my point here is simply that Bayes' theorem points us to this type of argument.

Of course, these arguments are qualitative, not quantitative. We cannot estimate the actual probabilities of any of these things with any precision. Even a general estimate of likeliness is made all the more complicated by the fact that we just don't have any idea of the sort of book that God would write if He were to write a book. We just don't have a good data set there.

Third, there is no magic bullet or killer argument. Each argument is of the form "This is more likely to have occurred if Theory X is correct than if Theory X is not correct." And each argument like that just shifts the odds, either a lot or a little. The only argument-ending argument would be one where the odds of a particular thing happening is zero if Theory X is correct. (Suppose that Type Y jars also had one purple marble, but Type H jars did not. If you drew a purple marble, you would know for sure that you had a Type Y jar, regardless of anything else.)

Fourth, the only way to have a comprehensive understanding of this debate is to consider all the arguments together. You cannot just look at one draw of a marble. You need to look at all draws — all the yellow marbles and all the green marbles. And here, this is complicated. There are lots of different arguments covering lots of different areas. It is virtually impossible to master them all.

Fifth, ideas and terms like "burden of proof" and "presumption" have no place in this debate. These are legal terms that reflect policy decisions. They involve who needs to come forward with evidence, what we will believe (as a matter of policy) in the absence of evidence, and what happens if the weight or convincing force of the evidence is exactly equal. But there should be plenty of evidence and argument on both sides. And in the extremely unlikely event that the weight of the evidence is exactly equal, one should just get more evidence and argument.

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The Documentary Hypothesis, Torah Min Hashamayim, and Bayes' Theorem - The Basics

There are two competing theories for the origins of the Torah: (1) Moses wrote it under God's guidance or dictation (often called "Torah from Heaven" or "Torah Min Hashamayim" or simply "TMH") and (2) multiple authors well after Moses' time wrote separate parts, and these were later compiled and edited into one document (the "Documentary Hypothesis" or "DH"). There are many arguments on all sides of this issue. (For what its worth, I think the DH is correct, and I will be examining the arguments for and against this in future posts. It is hard to beat the job that Little Foxling has done on his blog, although I will be approaching the problem from a slightly different perspective.)

But now I would like to focus on a logically prior issue: as we gather and consider evidence and arguments for and against each theory, how do we go about deciding which theory is correct? There's a lot of muddled thinking on this issue, and people recklessly throw around terms like "presumptions" and "burden of proof" here.

I think the answer lies in Bayes' Theorem, a well-known idea from probability theory. This theory tells us, in a rigorous way, how new information changes the relative probability of two separate and competing theories. And there are many implications of this theorem for the TMH / DH debate. For example, this theory explains why different people might reasonably reach different conclusions, even though they are looking at the same evidence and arguments.

The math is not that hard, although for these purposes the broader implications of Bayes' theorem are what's really important, not the technical mathematical ideas. After all, none of the TMS/DH claims can be given precise probability values. So if math isn't your "thing", don't worry. Skim the math, read the text, and you'll be fine.

Here's the basic problem Bayes' theorem addresses. Suppose you start with an initial estimate of the probability that a particular theory is true. Then you get new information that makes that theory more likely or less likely to be true. How does that effect your overall probability estimate?

The simplest example (and one used in just about every probability book) involves jars of colored marbles. So here goes. Suppose you have 100 (opaque and identical) jars filled with marbles. There are 50 "Type Y" jars (for "yellow") that have 90 yellow marbles and 10 green marbles. And there are 50 "Type "H" jars that have half-and-half: 50 green marbles and 50 yellow marbles.

Suppose you pick a jar at random. What is the probability you have a Type Y jar? That one shouldn't be too hard: 50%. (If you missed that one, you'll have to stay and clean the erasers.)

Now, here's the good part. You randomly pick one marble from your mystery jar (without looking inside), and it is a yellow marble. Great. 90% of the marbles in Type Y jars are yellow, but only 50% of the marbles in Type H jars are yellow. This new information --- your yellow marble --- is more consistent with a Type Y jar than a Type H jar. It is still possible you have an H jar, but it now seems more likely that you have a Y jar. How much did this new information shift your initial 50% chance of having a Y jar?

OK. Here comes the math. (Feel free to skim this part.) Here's Bayes' Theorem, with the explanation to follow.

P(A|B) = P(B|A) * P(A) / P(B)

P(something) means the probability of that something occurring.

A is the "prior event." In our example, it is "picking a Type Y jar" It is "prior" in the sense of not taking into account the later information.

B is the "posterior event." In our example, it is drawing out one yellow marble.

The vertical line | means "given that".

So this theorem in English says

The probability of prior even A given posterior event B is: the probability of B given A, times the probability of A, divided by the probability of B.

Lets see how this works out with our example.

P(A) is the prior or initial probability of getting a Type Y jar. That's 50% (That one is easy.)

P(B|A) is the probability of drawing out the yellow marble given that we picked a Type Y jar. That's easy too. There are 100 marbles in a Type Y jar, 90 of which are yellow. So it is 90%. Note that P(B|A) is the reverse of what we want to find, P(A|B). And that's where the power of Bayes' theorem comes in. We cannot easily figure out the latter, but we usually can figure out the former. Bayes' theorem tells us how to use the information we have to figure out what we don't have.

P(B) is the overall probability of drawing a yellow marble. Well, there are 10,000 marbles total (100 jars with 100 marbles each). Of those, 4,500 are yellow in Type Y jars (50 jars x 90 per jar), and 2,500 are yellow in Type H jars (50 jars x 50 per jar). So 7,000 of 10,000 marbles are yellow, and so P(B) = 70%.

Now, plugging all this in gives P(A|B) = (.9 * .5) / .7, which equals about 64.29%. Cool. We stated with a 50% chance of a Type Y jar, drew out one yellow marble, and now have a 64% chance of a Type Y jar.

Suppose we replaced the marble, shook the jar, drew a second marble, and it was yellow. The probability of 2 yellow marbles in a Type Y jar is 90% of 90% or 81%. But the probability of 2 yellow marbles in a Type H jar is 50% of 50%, or 25%. If we plug all this in, we get the probability of a Type Y jar given 2 yellow marbles is just over 76%. (I leave the math to the interested reader.)

So as we keep drawing marbles, the odds would continue to shift up or down, depending on whether we drew a yellow or green marble. As we draw lots of marbles, if our sample starts approaching 90% yellow, we become very likely to have picked a Type Y jar. And if our sample starts approaching 50% yellow, we become very likely to have picked a Type H jar.

Let me make one more quantitative observation. Suppose we start with a very unlikely initial probability estimate. To revise our example, suppose there are only 5 Type Y jars and 95 Type H jars. The initial odds are very small (only 5%) that we picked a Type Y jar. But if we keep drawing yellow marbles, those odds will go up dramatically and eventually get close to 100%.

I'll end this post here, and start the qualitative implications in the next post. Please comment in the next post only.

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Wednesday, May 28, 2008

The Theory of the Other Theory

Part of the problem that liberal Jews face is they accept traditional Judaism as "authentic" Judaism and then reject both, leaving themselves with a self-created self-defined inauthentic form of Judaism. I know I was stuck with this conceptual problem for a long time. But I broke out of this way of thinking, and I think others should do the same. One way of doing this is to understand what I call the theory of the other theory.

Orthodox Judaism has the following (greatly oversimplified) theory of liberal Judaism. God commanded us to keep the mitzvot. But this is difficult, and understanding why is sometimes complicated. Some people are confused, and they create confusing doctrines like liberal Judaism. Others don't like the "yoke of mitzvot", or have a strong yetzer harah, or are lazy, or are just evil, and so they create doctrines like liberal Judaism that let they avoid doing the right thing and keeping the difficult mitzvot and instead allow them to "pick and choose" what they want to do. They might be nice people, but their doctrines are just misguided. If you want "Torah true" Judaism — that is, authentic Judaism — stick with Orthodoxy.

(BTW, why is it always "pick and choose". Wouldn't "picking" by itself be sufficient? Once someone is already "picking" what else does he get by also "choosing"?)

I understand why Orthodox Jews accept this view. It follows from the Orthodox worldview. There is one right way, more or less, of thinking about Judaism, and a partial form of this is only partially good.

But liberal Jews should not accept this theory, and in fact it does not fit in with a liberal Jewish worldview. But many liberal Jews do in fact accept this understanding of their own religious beliefs, and it leads to problems. Perhaps part of the reason for this is that the liberal Jewish worldview is undertheorized, as a philosopher might put it, and this simply leads to a lot of confusion. But liberal Jews need a theory of liberal Judaism, as well as traditional Judaism.

Fortunately, I have one.

The Biblical writers might have had a lot of different reasons for writing the different parts of the Bible. Some were lofty and elevated, and others were the result of politics or self-interest. Some were just story telling. Put all that aside. A more relevant question — as James Kugel has argued here and in his book "How to Read the Bible" — is what were the early religious interpreters (more or less from the 3rd Century BCE to Talmudic times) doing? After all, they were the ones who turned the bible in to The Bible.

They were wrestling with some of the great questions in life. Some were philosophical: what does it all mean? what is the purpose of life? how do we balance between individualism and communitarianism? Some were ethical: how do we treat others? what moral virtues should we have and what moral vices should we avoid? Some were more practical: how do we have a good relationship with our parents, our spouses, our children, our friends, our business associates and customers, and even strangers and enemies? Some were legal: what property do we own? what can we do with it? and what happens if I accidentally harm you or your property? And some were scientific (in a prescientific age): how did the earth and the whole universe come into being? where did language come from?

They came up with a lot of different answers, practices, beliefs, stories, and rituals. Some were great. Some were just OK. And some were terrible. But things were sufficiently fluid and flexible that good ideas grew, bad ideas got weeded out, mediocre ideas improved. Note that some books were canonized; others were rejected. Some practices were adopted; others were rejected. Some movements thrived, others died out. Things were sufficiently flexible that after the destruction of the Second Temple, Yochanan ben Zakkai could reconceptualize the Temple sacrifices as prayer, the priests and prophets as rabbis, and convert sacrifice-based Jerusalem-centric Judaism into a portable religion that people could take not just to to Jamnia or the Galilee, but also to Babylon or Rome and even ultimately to America.

Many of these earlier Jewish answers and practices and beliefs do not work, or at least do not work well, in modern (or post-modern) society. For example, science answers a lot of the scientific questions very differently, and much more persuasively, than the Bible does. Idol-worshiping child-sacrificing Caananites might have made terrible neighbors and we might have wanted nothing to do with them, but 21st Century non-Jewish Americans make pretty swell neighbors overall. But many of the answers to the great issues that Judaism has considered and addressed over the past several thousand years remain valid and meaningful, and often spectacularly so.

A little Burkean conservativism helps a lot here. Judaism has produced some great results. We should change what we need to change, but we should be be very cautious about it.

In short, the liberal Jewish theory would be that many Jewish practices are good simply because they are good, not because a supernatural God said they are good. In fact, they might be divine because they are good, not the other way around. (We'll get to God in a separate post.) And they all hang together in a cohesive and mutually reinforcing way. This is so, regardless of what early interpreters or chazal thought they were actually doing.

This theory is based on the idea that Judaism is an evolving process, not a static set of beliefs and practices. And given this understanding, a liberal Jewish community that makes changes to Jewish beliefs and practices in light of changed circumstances or new and better understandings of things is acting in accord with "Torah true" Judaism. An Orthodox Jew who sticks to outmoded ways of thinking about things is standing still when he should be moving forward.

Of course, on any particular issue, there can be a vigorous debate about whether our current thinking is better than the traditional thinking. But as a general matter, that debate should occur, not be precluded by ideology.

Take a slightly corny analogy. The American founding fathers came up with some great ideas about how to run a democracy. We have modified the original structural rules only a handful of times in the 220 years since the Constitution was adopted. Most of these ideas are good simply because they are good, but some ideas (like slavery) were not. Now suppose that some movement in American thought that God literally appeared to the drafters in Philadelphia and told them what to write. Suppose further that we reject that claim and think that great people, but people nonetheless, wrote the Constitution. We would not view being an American as anything less than great, and we would not view changing the Constitution as bad. It would be a serious undertaking, requiring a lot of thought and consideration, but not something that would be off the table.

An important caveat here: the purpose of my analysis is not to bash the Orthodox. I am a firm believer in Jewish pluralism and diversity, and that includes believing that the Orthodox worldview (that ironically rejects such pluralism and diversity) has an important place is the marketplace of Jewish ideas. My claim is simply that it does not have the only place in this marketplace.

Liberal Jews who adopt this (or some other) affirmative theory of both liberal and Orthodox Judaism will avoid viewing their own Jewish practices and beliefs as incomplete or inauthentic.

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