Showing posts with label ethics. Show all posts
Showing posts with label ethics. Show all posts

Tuesday, July 29, 2008

God, Objective vs. Subjective Ethics (and Meta-Ethics), and the Limits of Moral (and Legal) Authority

Many religious people, including many religious Jews, believe that without God, there can be no "objective" ethics and, the argument continues for some, therefore no legitimate basis on which to define ethical conduct or "impose" moral authority on others.

I do not subscribe to this view.

In my experience, there is some confusion over what people mean by "objective" ethics. So, let me begin by offering two very different definitions, one focused on first-order ethics -- that is, defining what is "right" and "wrong" -- and the other focused on meta-ethics -- that is, defining the nature and foundation of ethics:

First-order "objective ethics" refers to ethical precepts of a general nature that apply similarly in all relevantly similar situations and circumstances. (Conversely, "subjective ethics" in this sense means that each individual defines his or her own ethical precepts, which may be different from other people in relevantly similar circumstances, and perhaps even different for the same person in relevantly similar circumstances.)

Meta-ethical "objective ethics" refers to ethical precepts that are external to human beings, like the law of gravity. (Conversely, "subjective ethics" in this sense means that moral views are human opinions grounded in human realities such as biology, psychology, and social interaction.)

Based on these definitions, several observations can be made:

1. Whether one subscribes to the objective or subjective meta-ethical view, one can adopt the first-order objective view. That is, whether we believe ethics are an independent constant or a human construction, we can believe that first-order ethical precepts apply similarly in similar situations.

Now, this is not to say that the subjectivist believes that ethical precepts can be "true" or "false" -- that is, demonstrated as one would a mathematical proof or the law of gravity. But to say they cannot be proven is not to say they are not objective. It is one thing to claim that some action in some set of circumstances -- say, torturing your child for getting up from the dinner table, or ignoring the presence of a destitute beggar on the street -- is always "right" or "wrong." It is a very different thing to claim that this can be demonstrated to anyone using some set of logical principles (and that any lack of agreement could only be explained by some failure of apprehension).

(Incidentally, although there is a difference of opinion about whether first-order precepts can be "true" or "false," both meta-ethical objectivists and subjectivists agree that meta-ethical statements can be true or false.)

2. The meta-ethical subjective stance is not the same as moral relativism. One can take the view that moral principles are a human construct, but nonetheless do not necessarily vary in different contexts and cultures.

3. The meta-ethical subjective stance is not the same as moral nihilism. One can take the view that moral principles are a human construct, but nonetheless have substance and meaning.

4. Theists need not be meta-ethical objectivists, and atheists need not be meta-ethical subjectivists. Although atheists often adopt the subjectivist position, it is logically possible and not uncommon for atheists to advance the argument that ethics can be objectively derived from the nature of humans and reality. Similarly, although theists usually adopt the objectivist position, it is logically possible and not uncommon for theists to believe that God did not "create" moral law. (The Euthyphro dilemma speaks to this latter issue.)

I adopt the subjectivist meta-ethical view because I believe first-order ethical precepts are inextricably linked with "values" -- propositions about what is meaningful and worthwhile that are connected to, but not logically dictated by, "facts" about humans and the world.

If we believe there is no God, or that God did not "create" a moral reality, we are not launched into a moral abyss without any points of reference for humans to create ethical constructs. Virtually all humans share the same basic survival and growth needs, certain core emotional responses, and certain core social behaviors. We all share the same physical reality and rules of logic.

Thus, we can have meaningful conversations about values being more or less desirable notwithstanding the fact that we may not be able to "prove" anything in this regard. The reasons why most people agree about murder might be more like the reasons most people agree about sauerkraut ice cream than we think.

Western philosophy has offered a variety of systems for weighing values and making moral judgments, based on virtue, justice, natural rights, utilitarianism, and the common good, among other things. None of these is completely satisfactory to me, but they all offer signposts. They also present more than a little evidence for the proposition that meaningful conversations are possible in the absence of a provable solution.

But if murder really is a lot like sauerkraut ice cream, some have argued, we lose any basis on which to "impose" our moral judgment on others -- whether through mere moral persuasion or an attempt to actually control and/or punish certain behavior.

The former proposition is simpler to address. We can try to "convince" people that fine French food is "better" than sauerkraut ice cream (or McDonald's or fine Italian food) by appealing to their own internal sense perceptions and instincts, principles of cooking, facts about the nature of the human tongue and taste sensation, and on and on. And we can try to "convince" people that murder is "worse" than the alternative by appealing to their own internal perceptions and instincts, principles of human biology and psychology, social dynamics, the value systems listed above, and on and on.

But we cannot "prove" murder is wrong any more than we can "prove" sauerkraut ice cream is yucky. This is in my view a reality of the human condition.

And even if we could "prove" ethical rules, that would not result in everyone following them. This is in my view another reality of the human condition.

The good news from my point of view is that Judaism is a superb vehicle for tackling moral issues. This is not because God exists, or because the Torah was written by God, but because the Torah and other sources of Jewish wisdom do an excellent job of elucidating a set of values that are well-grounded in the realities of human nature and experience and exploring not only how they fit together, but also how they stand in tension. (After all, "ethical dilemmas" usually arise when important values stand in opposition, not when everything points in the same direction.) For someone preoccupied with ethical behavior -- "making better people and making people better," as I am fond of saying -- Judaism is first and foremost useful.

The latter proposition -- the use of individual force or communal police power -- is not so much a matter of ethics as political philosophy. Our right to stop (or punish) the murderer is not based on the fact that we can "prove" that murder is wrong; it is based on our individual desire to protect ourselves and others from being murdered and from our communal agreement to form societies and governments that will exercise this power on our behalf.

The reason that murder and sauerkraut ice cream are different is not that one is a matter of fact and the other is a matter of taste. The difference lies in the fact that murderers create consequences that sauerkraut ice cream eaters do not. The decision to stop or punish the murderer lies in a moral and political consensus about the desirability of doing so and not on pure logic.

In this realm, Jewish wisdom is somewhat less useful. The Torah and Oral Law more or less assume a world in which Jewish religious authority and government authority are one in the same. There are not simply moral maxims and lessons; there are consequences and penalties imposed not only by God but also by men. This is not to say that Jewish wisdom does not speak to issues of politics and government. But in our modern secular world, there is generally a disconnect between religious authority on the one hand and government authority and police power on the other. (Indeed, some religious conservatives have as a top priority either eliminating this disconnect or working around it through separation from secular society.) A moral consensus, based on religious principles or otherwise, may produce the political consensus necessary to exercise authority, but that does not mean that the moral and political consensus are one in the same.

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Thursday, June 19, 2008

Doing The Right Thing

What matters most to me about Judaism (and religion in general) is how -- or, regrettably, in some cases, whether -- it empowers people to "do the right thing." Making better people and making people better is more important to me than abstract philosophical inquiry and speculation. To put it another way, I am much more interested in Jewish values than Jewish metaphysics.

One way to think about how Judaism makes me, or anyone, a better person, is to describe how Jewish values and practice operate as a sort of two-step process: 1) helping people to understand what the "right thing" is, and 2) helping people to actually DO the right thing once they know what it is.

When we think about the first step -- figuring out "right and wrong" -- Jewish law and wisdom is obviously encyclopedic and, in my opinion, Jewish values are remarkably subtle and penetrating. But there is a further distinction with regard to this first step that I find useful.

On one level, Jewish values identify ethical behavior in a variety of contexts that most people (read: most people I know, or know of, including non-Jews) would immediately identify as "ethically charged." That is, in situations where wide agreement prevails that there "is" an "ought to" -- sometimes very easy to identify, sometimes not so easy, and sometimes very difficult.

But on another level, Judaism expands the universe of normative ethics into contexts that I do not believe most people would find to be obviously a matter of ethics at all. By way of example, this might include being cheerful, not smoking, or observing kashrut. (I find the line between "ritual" and "ethical" mitzvot blurry at best.) So, Jewish values not only help provide the right "choice" in moral dilemmas (or where no dilemma presents itself -- people are rarely "torn" about whether to commit wanton murder); they also define the landscape of ethical human action to include many things that might not so obviously have a moral component. Insofar as we find these Jewish values important and worthwhile, this is a very good thing. Indeed, the farther we move away from the obviously ethical -- that is, those questions of human action where there is vast agreement of a moral component and vast agreement of the "right answer" -- the more important these values become as an agent for positive change in people and in the world.

Turning to the second step, Jewish practice provides a rigorous web for reinforcing and living these values. Jewish prayer is replete with admonitions that are designed not so much to teach us what the right thing is as to help us actually do it, if by no more subtle a method than putting certain obligations in the forefront of our mind. I agree wholeheartedly with non-religionists that one does not need God or religion, neither as a conceptual nor a practical matter, to know right from wrong or to do right and not wrong. But I also point out that it helps me a lot to regularly pray, "to honor father and mother," "to visit the sick," "to make peace where there is strife," "keep my tongue from evil and my lips from lies," "let me be humble in the presence of all," and so on.

In addition, the Jewish synagogue and the Jewish community obviously provide a communal structure for living Jewish values -- of tzedakah, of tikkun olam, of acts of loving kindness. Again, while these religious institutions are by no means the unique agent of reinforcing positive values and putting them into action, they have been doing quite a good job of this for quite a long time. And because these institutions are so integrated into the daily lives of their members, as individuals and as families, they can be more effective than most other civic and charitable organizations that promote similar values. (Naturally, as has been discussed elsewhere on this blog, there are also lots of other reasons for Jews to live a Jewish life and, correspondingly, affiliate with a synagogue.)

At the intersection of these two "steps" -- which are much more intertwined than this discussion implies -- is sensitivity. Speaking very personally, I see this process of moral education and reinforcement as a process of making me more sensitive to people and to doing the right thing. I can't possibly overstate the importance of this type of sensitivity. I know too many people who spend a lot of time thinking and debating about moral philosophy and political philosophy, but are not all that kind, or loving, or generous. They sometimes appear to be more interested in ideas than anything else. Of course, far more common, are people who simply do not have these values in the forefront of their mind or their behavior. This doesn't mean they are bad or evil people; in most cases, thankfully, it is quite to the contrary. But my personal experience has taught me that I become a better person -- a better husband, a better father, a better friend, a better boss, a better teacher -- when I keep these values vitally present in my mind and in my heart.

Finally, I want to stress that my discussion here is obviously personal, and furthermore focused on personal ethics -- that is, how I conduct myself in my interpersonal relationships (not merely with friends and intimates, but with all other people). I have completely ignored a set of questions raised in other threads about how to demonstrate or "prove" that these Jewish values are good, and on what basis they might be "enforced" on others. ("How do we convince the would-be murderer that he's wrong and we're right, and on what moral authority do we restrain or punish him?") As has been debated in these other threads, I believe questions of how governments or other rule-making authorities -- who can promulgate and enforce values as laws -- function ethically or morally ("legitimately" might be more apt) is a different (albeit related) matter. Questions of how these governments relate ethically or morally to each other on the international stage is still another step removed. I plan to address these matters in a future post.

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Thursday, May 29, 2008

Pagan Justice, Christian Love, and Levinasian Judaism

In his justly-famed essay, “Pagan Justice, Christian Love,” philosopher Bernard Williams identifies a certain tension in the developing Greek understanding of the demands of justice towards one’s “enemies” (and secondarily, towards slaves). Put simply, at least one question he engages is whether or to what extent for the ancients, treating one’s enemies badly – deliberately doing things to make them worse off – was either actually positively demanded by justice (as much as is doing well by one’s friends), or rather whether enemies (or more obviously, slaves) fell outside the demands of justice, so that justice in that sense permitted but did not require their bad treatment. Williams identifies Socrates (or Plato) as the source of a more universalizing tendency, together with a historical development away from individualized vengeance (the carrying out of private justice) and toward state-sponsored and state-regulated punishments of wrongdoers.

Still, one is left with a residual puzzle about the appropriate treatment of those who have wronged one (or one’s friends): is it ever morally permissible, we might ask in contemporary terms, to bring it about that a person is worse off in respect of those admittedly finite goods (health, wealth, comfort, etc.) we can affect? Like the secularist that he was, Williams recoils in both mock (literary) and apparently genuine horror at the Christian “solution” – that one may only “harm” someone when in doing so, one does good for him. That is, the requirements of Christian love or agape, that one “love” everyone, are not held to be incompatible with making certain people objectively worse off as part of a system of punishment, but rather undergird the system of punishment itself. Williams amusingly, but pointedly, calls this “a way that achieves, with awesome dialectical horribleness, the worst of two worlds.”

He concludes the essay by remarking, “The conclusion must be neither Socratic nor Christian. The old rule has to be tamed and directed, both politically and psychologically, rather than metaphysically transcended or transmuted into universal agape.”

The conclusion which is “neither Socratic nor Christian” is in fact to be found in the Torah, which antedates them both, and is articulated compellingly by Levinas in the Bible discussion contained in “Towards the Other.” Levinas fashions this subtle theory, which does indeed “tame[] and direct[], both politically and psychologically,” the impulse of the “old rule” (which closely resembles lex talionis), from an otherwise somewhat mystifying Biblical passage about a group who were in some way wronged, and who demanded, and received, justice from Israel.
Precisely what that wrong was is addressed by the rabbis of the Talmud at Yebamot 58b-59a. Although they were given justice in a form that would be entirely recognizable to the Athenian – the Gibeonites were mistreated by Saul, and demanded seven of Saul’s descendants to be handed over and killed. David acceded to this request. (2 Sam. 21.)

Two notable consequences followed. Notwithstanding that Israel had given justice in these terms, Israel continued to suffer punishment for the underlying offense, a somewhat bleak reminder that wrongs can never be made good, that there is a residual offense which can never be recompensed, because one cannot go back in time and undo the act. The incommensurability of wrongs and any subsequent compensation for them is a deep fact of history which Anglo-American law (among other forms of jurisprudence) systematically elides.

But more important for the Biblical narrative, the group that demands and receives justice is, we later learn, a group with whom intermarriage is prohibited. The reason for the prohibition is that they have set themselves apart from Israel, and the interpretive move that Levinas makes is to identify their (rightful) demand for justice as the act by which they set themselves outside of the moral community he identifies as “Israel.” The highest moral moment, for Levinas, comes when, fully understanding that one has a claim as a matter of justice, one refrains from demanding its satisfaction. This is the test the Gibeonites, as it were, failed.

As if often the case with standards of behavior set by Levinas, this goes much further even than the extreme formulation of Socrates that it is better to suffer injustice than to commit it. It is the claim that it is better to suffer injustice than to seek justice on one’s own behalf. Note that it is not Levinas’ claim that it is improper to seek justice on behalf of others, and this of course runs into the same paradox Williams identifies in Plato – namely, if the person cannot actually be harmed by the loss of finite goods, why is there such great concern that one not harm others in respect of these finite goods? Levinas not only is vulnerable to this problem, he actually embraces the radical asymmetry between self and Other that this opens up.

In any event, the point being made by Levinas here (in the larger context of the Holocaust, and Germans and Jews after the Holocaust), is to identify as the characteristic (aspirational) Jewish moral stance, that one correctly recognize that one has a claim of justice, and nevertheless elect not to pursue it. The political arrangement that tames the old rule is therefore a civil and criminal justice system with well-defined claims and penalties, and the Torah and its later elaboration in the Talmud certainly provides this, with a detail and subtlety not found in Anglo-American law until centuries later. But the psychological taming and direction consist precisely in a moral education that enables one to discern when one’s legitimate grievances ought nevertheless not to be pursued. Socrates, in all his moral grandeur, asks less of us than the rabbis of the Talmud as read by Levinas.

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