Showing posts with label daughters of Zelophehad. Show all posts
Showing posts with label daughters of Zelophehad. Show all posts

Thursday, July 16, 2009

The Daughters of Zelophechad 2 - Legal Theory, Common Law, and Repeated Commands

A commenter Jerry raised an important challenge (here and here)to my interpretation of the Daughters of Zelophechad story (here and here). My argument, in short, is that Moses's final political act was to modify a halachic rule in the name of God, but without consulting God, to promote justice. In doing so, he created a common law system. The story is in Numbers 36:1-12.

Jerry disagrees. He argues, based on Number 36:5 and 6, that Moses did consult God first. The narrative of that consultation is omitted in the text, but it is referred to by Moses. He further argues that this story is shortened because the action speeds up once Moses's death is announced in Number 27:12.

This argument is plausible, but I think my reading is better.

The Torah contains three stories involving a change in the law, and the question I am addressing is what do we make of these stories. A careful look at the three stories shows an interesting change in structure.

The first story involves the second passover (pesach sheni) story in Numbers 9. God issues a command regarding the passover sacrifices. Some people come to Moses with a particular problem. They are ritually unclean (since they just buried a dead person) and cannot offer the sacrifice. (Num. 9:6-7), Moses then consults God and God explicitly responds with a change in the law, namely, that they can celebrate Passover a month later. (Num. 9:8-14). God not only modifies the law for people who are ritually unclean, but also for people who are are on a long trip. Notably, God changes the law without commentary or explanation, but the clear implication is that the old law did not work well, at least for these people in these particular circumstances.

The second story involves the Daughters of Zelophechad. (Num 27.) They come to Moses with a particular problem with the law (Num 27:1-4), and the text explicitly states that that Moses consulted God and God responded with a change in the law. (Num 27:5-6.) Here, God changes the law because the daughters' claim is "just".

The third story involves the men from Manasseh wanting a further modification to the previous law change. They consult Moses and explain the problem. (Num 38:1-4.) But there is no account of Moses consulting God as he did in the two earlier stories. Instead, the next sentence simply says "And Moses commanded the children of Israel on (or about) the word of God." (Num 36:5.) And then, "This is the word (or thing) that the Lord has commanded regarding Zelophechad's daughters." (Num 36:6.)

From a purely halachic point of view, all three stories are unnecessary. The final halachic rule is "Do X, unless Y applies, in which case do Z." The Torah could have simply set forth the rule in that form. (E.g., Celebrate Passover on 14th of Nissan. However, if you are ritually unclean or on a long trip, celebrate it on the 14th of Iyar.) However, the Torah gives us the general rule, a story where this general rule creates a problem, the people effected asking Moses for an exception, Moses consulting God, and God agreeing to the exception. In fact, with the two Daughters of Zelophechad stories, there is a complex final rule involving a limitation to an exception to a rule.

My claim is that the purpose of the stories is to show that halacha is a common law system. It evolves and changes. In the first story (pesach sheni), the problem involves people who are ritually unclean, but God imposes a broader exception (for people who are unclean or on a trip). This shows that exceptions are not always limited to particular cases, but may involve broader categories or similar categories. In the second story (Daughters of Zelophechad), the change is made in the interests of justice. That is, it identifies one particular reason for making a change in the law. And in the third case (men from Manasseh), there is a shift in the source of the change. Rather than the text explicitly stating Moses consulted God and God commanded the change, we have no mention of Moses consulting God and Moses commanding the change himself, albeit stating that it is from God. My claim is that this story teaches that once Moses knew the principles and was old and wise, he himself could modify the law under appropriate circumstances in accordance with these principles. And this change in the law is in fact commanded by God. In other words, this is another example of people acting to bring Godliness into the world, rather than God acting to bring Godliness into the world in a supernatural way.

This is a perfectly reasonable way to run a legal system. English and American common law have worked this way for the better part of a millennium. In fact, I think the halachic system recognizes this explicitly. Not only can leaders impose new laws as "fences", but they can also command that positive Torah mitzvot not be performed (such as the rule prohibiting the explicit Torah mitzvah of hearing the shofar on Rosh Hashana when RH falls on Shabbat).

Jerry notes that the wording in this third story is used elsewhere. The text says "And Moses commanded the children of Israel according to the word of the LORD, saying: 'The tribe of the sons of Joseph speaketh right. This is the thing which the LORD hath commanded concerning the daughters of Zelophehad, saying: ....'" That is, Moses himself notes that God issued these commands. And this form is used elsewhere. For example, "And Moses spoke unto the heads of the tribes of the children of Israel, saying: This is the thing which the LORD hath commanded: . . . ." (Num. 30:2.) In this last example, there is no record of God explicitly saying these things, but presumably God did. So too in Numbers 34, argues Jerry.

This is certainly a plausible reading of the text. But this theory does not explain why the structure of the narrative changed from the earlier two stories (where God was explicitly consulted) to here, where God is not explicitly consulted in the text. And it does not explain what we learn from this story. We already know from the earlier two stories that God can change the law and that God does so when a claim is "just."

Jerry's explanation is that the narrative needs to speed up once Moses's death is announced in Number 27:12. But a single sentence saying that Moses asked God would not drag things out. Note how this is dealt with in the second story: "And Moses brought their cause before the LORD. And the LORD spoke unto Moses, saying: . . . ." That doesn't really slow down the action a lot. And of course we have the entire book of Deuteronomy before Moses finally dies, and the action comes to a complete stop during that book.

Moreover, Numbers 28 (the chapter immediately after Moses's future death is announced) contains a long speech by God. Jerry notes this and argues that it is a "follow up" to the same commands in Exodus. True, but that makes matters worse. If the text is trying to speed up, it makes no sense to include repetitive mitzvot and add extra text involving God speaking.

But strictly speaking, Jerry's reading is plausible. There is enough in the text, consistent with other areas of the Torah, to support the reading that Moses did consult God here. And my reading is plausible as well. There is an odd change in the structure of these stories that is only explained by the idea that Moses did not explicitly consult God but made the change himself based on divine principles. And my theory ties in with a broader notion of the common law evolution of halacha. But neither of our theories give a broader account of when the Torah presents a command by stating that God says X, that Moses says God says X, or both.

Eilu v'eilu.

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Sunday, July 13, 2008

The Daugters of Zelophehad, Evolving Halacha, and the Common Law

This week's parsha (Pinchas) contains one of the most fascinating legal stories in the Torah. This story sets up an evolving common law approach to halacha.

There are not very many legal stories in the Torah. There are stories and there are laws, but not many stories about laws. After the grand epics in Genesis and Exodus and the lofty and technical holiness rituals in Leviticus, we turn in Numbers to ordinary life problems. Or, as Arnold Eisen argued in Taking Hold of Torah, we have entered the world of politics: wars with hostile neighboring countries, civil insurrection, gossip, the succession of rulers, and the details of civil administration.

And the laws of land inheritance in Israel. By way of background, each of the 12 tribes would own a specific region of the land, and all of the families in that tribe would own some portion of the land. The land would remain in the tribe and family. In fact, if the land were sold, it would revert back to the family in the Jubilee year every fifty years. (Lev. 25:13, 23-24.) Since one's tribe is determined patrilineally, only males can inherit land. Thus, a father's land holdings would be passed down to his son or sons. A daughter would presumably marry and join the family of her husband, and their sons would inherent the land from their father. In short, the law set up a fairly conservative and static system that would preserve family land holdings through male inheritance.

This was the state of the law until the daughters of Zelophehad showed up. (Num. 27:1-11.) Zelophehad was a member of the tribe of Manasseh, and he died with five daughters but no sons. Under the rules then in place, his daughters would be left with no inheritance. The daughters argued to Moses and everyone else that they should be allowed to inherent his share. "Let not our father's name be lost to his clan just because he had no son! Give us a holding among our father's kinsmen." (Num 27:4.)

Moses checked with God, and God said that the daughters were right. "The plea of Zelophehad's daughter is just." (Num. 27:5.) From now on, the rule is that if a man dies without sons but with daughters, the property should be transferred to his daughters. (If he dies without any children, there is a more complex hierarchy of inheritance.)

Importantly, this was not merely an elaboration or clarification of the existing law but an entirely new rule. Before this "case" was brought, the daughters would have received nothing and Zelophehad's other relatives would have inherited land. Now the daughters inherent and the other relatives receive nothing. And the basis for this change in the law, according to God, is simply justice. "The plea of Zelophehad's Daughter's is just." (Num. 27:5.)

This story shows the evolution of the law. The children of Israel started with one set of legal rules, but they proved to be unjust in a particular situation. God then modified the rules to comport with justice, producing a second set of rules.

If this story does not show that halacha evolves, there's more. Eight chapters later, in the last chapter of Numbers, new people show up with a new problem with this law. And it changes again. (Num. 36:1-12.)

The family heads of Zelophehad's clan show up with a complaint. If the daughters of Zelophehad marry someone from another tribe, their sons will inherit not only their father's land holding (from the other tribe), but also the land holdings of Zelophehad (from Manasseh). So someone from another tribe will end up owning land smack dab in the middle of Manasseh. The total amount of land that the people of Manasseh own will be permanently reduced.

Moses agreed with this argument and "commanded the children of Israel according to the word of the Lord, saying 'The pleas of the the tribe of the sons of Joseph is just.'" Moses then set forth a new rule: daughters may inherit under the old rule only if they marry members of their own tribe. If they marry members of a different tribe, they may not inherit. (The end of the story is that the Daughters of Zelophehad ended up marrying their uncles or cousins, and everyone lived happily ever after.)

So by this time, the law has now gone through three stages of development: the original law (only sons inherit), the modified law (daughters can inherit if there are no sons), and the modified modified law (only if they marry someone from their tribe).

Several points are worth noting here.

First, the Torah could have given us just the final rule without showing any of its intermediate forms of development. The fact that we see the evolution of the law suggests that the evolution itself is important, not just the final law.

Second, Moses used the identical language (and the Hebrew is identical: keyn) to describe the plea of the Manasseh tribe here that God used to describe the plea of the daughters of Zelophehad. Their plea is "just". (Some translations use "right".)

Third, the text does not say that Moses checked with God before stating the new rule. Instead, Moses himself spoke to the Children of Israel "al pi Adonai": according to the work of God.

Fourth, Moses changed the very law that God himself had changed.

What do we make of this? It seems to me that God, responding to the daughters of Zelophehad, set forth a methodology for determining when laws should change: if a party successfully argues that a particular law is unjust or not right, the law should change on that ground and that ground alone. God himself changed the law when confronted with this problem. Once God established this methodology, Moses was free to employ it himself in response to the other members of the tribe of Manasseh, and in doing so he spoke "al pi Adonai." And there is no hierarchy of laws here: Moses changed the same law that God himself had changed.

This may seem like a radical notion of law. But in fact, it is exactly how Anglo-American common law works. Judges initially promulgate a set of rules, one case at a time. But over time, new situations arise that do not merely require the application of existing laws to new situations, but actually require the legal rules themselves to change in response to these new situations. But this is not a license for judges to change the law because of personal preferences or to ignore the law altogether. Under stare decisis, there is a strong presumption for leaving settled law alone. It takes a strong showing of injustice to change the common law. But when a party can make such a showing, the common law changes.

The story of the daughters of Zelophehad seems to set up a similar evolving common law system of halacha, not a static system.

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